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SARBANES-OXLEY AND ALASKA 
NATIVE CORPORATIONS: DO THE 
REGULATIONS APPLY? 
S. MIKE MURPHY* 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a wide-reaching securities 
regulatory reform effort aimed at protecting shareholders and 
increasing corporate managerial accountability.  This Note 
assesses the impact of the new regulations on Alaska Native 
Corporations.  After establishing that Native Corporations are 
largely exempt from most of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, this Note argues, nevertheless, that it would be 
prudent and consistent with the founding purposes of Native 
Corporations to adjust their internal best practice to mirror the 
requirements of the Act. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”) are complicated 
entities.  ANCs exist in a regulatory world of exceptions, 
exemptions, and special rules and regulations designed to help 
them achieve their intended purpose: helping Alaska Natives.  The 
unique framework of federal and state rules that govern ANCs 
benefits those organizations and, in turn, improves the welfare of 
Alaska Natives and enhances the Alaskan economy.  What 
happens, however, when a set of broad, new federal securities 
regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),1 
interacts with the more specific regulatory regime applicable to 
ANCs?  This Note addresses that question. 
This analysis will begin with a general background of ANCs 
and some of the characteristics that make them different from 
other corporations.  It will then undertake a detailed examination 
of SOX, apply the Act’s provisions to ANCs, and ultimately 
determine that SOX has only a negligible impact on the 
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 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
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governance and regulation of ANCs.  Next, this Note will analyze 
the interaction between SOX and the provisions of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act that bring ANCs within the scope of 
some securities regulations.  The analysis will conclude that ANCs 
still largely avoid the impact of SOX and the protections that 
Congress intended the Act to provide to shareholders. 
Once SOX’s impact is established, this Note will analyze 
whether the end result is good for ANCs.  This inquiry will 
examine policy issues, congressional intent, and the historical 
record of foul play by ANCs to conclude that the goals of ANCs 
would be better met if they were subject to the provisions of SOX.  
Finally, the analysis concludes with recommendations for 
incorporating the requirements of SOX into ANCs’ “best 
practices.” 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 1971 Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)2 to address longstanding land disputes 
between Alaska Natives and the U.S. government as well as 
intense oil speculation that accompanied the operation of multiple 
profitable oil fields in Alaska.3  Because of these conditions, 
Congress found “an immediate need” for the settlement of Alaska 
Native claims of land ownership in the state, and ANCSA was 
Congress’s solution.4 
ANCSA addresses the formation of ANCs.5  These native 
corporations distribute the benefits of ANCSA to Alaska Natives.6  
They own land and operate for the benefit of Alaska Natives,7 and 
some have evolved into sophisticated, multinational organizations 
with multimillion dollar annual revenues.8  Just like ordinary 
corporations, profits from ANCs may be distributed to 
shareholders in the form of dividends.9  In addition to dividends, 
ANCs provide jobs and the benefits of economic development to 
Alaska Natives. 
 
 2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2000). 
 3. DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND, TAKE MY LIFE 2–10 (2001). 
 4. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
 5. See §§ 1606–1607 (creating two classes of native corporations: regional 
corporations and village corporations). 
 6. § 1606(j). 
 7. § 1606(d). 
 8. See Cook Inlet Tribal Council, Inc. Annual Report, 2004 Annual Report, 
http://www.citci.com/ (follow “Annual Reports” hyperlink; then follow “2003-2004 
Annual Report” hyperlink). 
 9. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(C). 
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The drafters of ANCSA set forth rules that govern the 
financial operations of ANCs in the text of the statute.10  State 
statutes followed, which helped clarify the financial duties of the 
directors of ANCs.11  However, in their hurry to settle land 
disputes, neither the drafters of ANCSA nor state lawmakers 
anticipated the possible effects of wide-reaching federal regulations 
that had yet to be enacted.  One such regulation is SOX, which 
Congress appears to have intended to apply somewhat broadly to 
publicly held entities.  Unfortunately, directors and general 
counsels of ANCs are unsure of exactly how SOX, a monumental 
act, affects ANCs.  The costs of SOX compliance are high, but the 
fines and criminal penalties for violating the Act make ignoring it a 
very risky prospect.12 
This Note will address the applicability of SOX to ANCs.  It 
will first examine whether part or all of SOX applies to ANCs.  
This analysis will begin with the text of SOX.  It will next analyze 
the legislative history of SOX in order to gain insight into the 
legislative intent of the Act as it relates to ANCs.  Finally, this 
article will examine how the enactment of SOX should change the 
“best practices” of ANCs. 
It should be cautioned that many ANCs operate largely 
through subsidiaries that do not themselves qualify as ANCs.13  
This Note addresses only the applicability of SOX to the ANCs 
themselves, not their subsidiaries. 
III.  THE NATURE OF THE ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATION 
The ANC is a vehicle used to transfer benefits of the ANCSA 
to Alaska Natives.  For administrative purposes, ANCSA divided 
Alaskan land and Alaska Natives into twelve geographic regions.14  
A thirteenth “region” was added for Alaska Natives who do not 
reside in the state of Alaska.15  Each of these regions was 
incorporated into a for-profit corporation under Alaska state law.16  
 
 10. E.g., § 1606. 
 11. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.433, .960, .961 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. III 2003) (fine, twenty years 
imprisonment, or both). 
 13. For example, Calista Corporation performs much of its business through 
its five major subsidiaries: Tunista, Inc., Yulista Management Services Inc., 
Chiulista Camp Services, Inc., Ookichista Drilling Services, Inc., and Ilikista 
Ventures, Inc.  See Subsidiary Companies, http://www.calistacorp.com/busent.html 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006). 
 14. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a). 
 15. § 1606(c). 
 16. See § 1606(d). 
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These corporations have boards of directors, bylaws, managers, 
and stockholders, much like any typical public corporation.17  
However, ANCs are atypical in some critical ways.  The differences 
are particularly important when it comes to the specific properties 
of the stocks they issue and their status with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 
A. ANC Stock 
Initially, original ANC stock (known as “Settlement Common 
Stock”) was distributed by each regional corporation to every 
Alaska Native who was a member of that region.18  One hundred 
shares of Settlement Common Stock was given to each enrolled 
Alaska Native.19  Each share carries with it all the rights carried by 
any normal share distributed by an Alaska corporation, such as the 
right to vote for directors.20  ANCs are authorized to issue more 
stock in accordance with their articles of incorporation.  The initial 
issuance of Settlement Common Stock was given equally to every 
Alaska Native individual who lived in the region of each 
corporation.21 
Settlement Common Stock is unique in that it initially could 
not be sold or “otherwise alienated” except in some narrow 
circumstances,22 and then only to another Alaska Native or a 
descendant of a Native.23  However, there is an opt-out provision 
that became effective on December 18, 1991, that allows ANCs to 
amend their articles of incorporation in order to end all alienability 
restrictions.24  If an ANC chooses this route, all of its original 
Settlement Common Stock would be canceled, and new 
 
 17. § 1606(f). 
 18. See § 1606(g)(1)(A). 
 19. Id. 
 20. § 1606(h)(1). 
 21. § 1606(g)(2). 
 22. § 1606(h)(1)(B)–(C).  Examples of when Settlement Common Stock can 
be transferred include inter vivos gifts to one’s children and transfers pursuant to a 
court decree of separation, divorce, or child support.  However, in these situations, 
the recipient must be an Alaska Native or a descendent of a Native.  § 
1606(h)(1)(C).  Settlement Common Stock can also be transferred through 
inheritance “in accordance with the lawful will of such holder or pursuant to 
applicable laws of intestate succession.”  § 1606(h)(2)(A).  Regional corporations 
may nevertheless have the right to purchase, at fair market value, transfers made 
pursuant to applicable laws of intestate succession to a person not a Native or a 
descendent of a Native.  § 1606(h)(2)(B). 
 23. § 1606(h)(1)(C). 
 24. § 1629c(b). 
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“Replacement Common Stock” would be issued in its place.25  In 
the event that a Settlement Common Stockholder fails to exchange 
original Settlement Common Stock with Replacement Common 
Stock, ANCs would have a right to repurchase the Settlement 
Common Stock for “fair value.”26 
B. ANCs and the SEC 
At their formation, ANCs were exempt from the jurisdiction 
of the SEC.27  Specifically, they were statutorily exempted from 
“the provisions, as amended, of the Investment Company Act of 
1940, . . . the Securities Act of 1933, . . . and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.”28  However, this exception is not absolute.  
It lasts only until any of three events occurs: (i) the ANC issues 
stock of any type besides Settlement Common Stock, where this 
new stock is issued to anyone besides Alaska Natives who were 
eligible for Settlement Common Stock or to an entity that does not 
exist solely for the benefit of Alaska Natives, provided that the new 
stock is not an exempt security pursuant to SEC rules;29 (ii) the 
ANC terminates the alienability restrictions on its outstanding 
Settlement Common Stock;30 or (iii) the ANC registers with the 
SEC.31  The occurrence of any of these three events eliminates an 
ANC’s jurisdictional immunity from the provisions and 
requirements of the SEC.32 
C. The Issue of Who is an “Issuer” 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of determining whether specific 
provisions of SOX apply to ANCs is the definition of the word 
“issuer”33 under SOX.34  Many provisions of SOX dealing with the 
operations of businesses apply only to issuers.35  The term issuer as 
used here is distinguished from the ordinary usage of the word, 
which refers to any company that issues securities.  Under SOX, a 
corporation is an issuer if: (i) it has securities registered under 
 
 25. § 1606(h)(3). 
 26. § 1606(h)(2)(B). 
 27. § 1625. 
 28. § 1625(a). 
 29. § 1625(a)(1). 
 30. § 1625(a)(2). 
 31. § 1625(a)(3). 
 32. § 1625(b). 
 33. An issuer is basically an SEC reporting company, but this paper will follow 
the convention set in the definition in SOX. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7) (Supp. IV 2006). 
 35. See, e.g., § 78m (Supp. III 2003) (dealing with corporate responsibility). 
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section 12 of that Securities Exchange Act; (ii) it is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of 15 U.S.C. 78o(d); or (iii) it has filed a 
registration statement with the SEC, even if that registration has 
not become effective where the company has not withdrawn the 
registration. 36  ANCs may qualify as issuers under any of these 
three tests. 
Determination of whether an ANC is an issuer under the first 
test involves a two-prong analysis.37  ANCs must first meet the 
definition of issuer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and, 
second, they must be required to register under section 12 of that 
act, which provides: 
[A]ny person who issues or proposes to issue any security; 
except that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities, 
voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with 
respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated 
investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed, 
restricted management, or unit type, the term “issuer” means the 
person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of 
depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or 
other agreement or instrument under which such securities are 
issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust 
certificates or like securities, the term “issuer” means the person 
by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, used. 38 
ANCs fall within this definition because they issue securities and 
they are, in fact, required to issue Settlement Common Stock.39  
While such stock is not ordinarily a security, it does not fall under 
any of the exceptions in the statute. 
Further, under the two-prong test, a corporation’s securities 
must also be registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act, which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any member, 
broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security (other 
than an exempted security) on a national securities exchange unless 
a registration is effective as to such security for such 
exchange . . . .”40  ANCs are all initially exempted securities under 
ANCSA, so this section does not apply.  Even if an ANC were to 
lose its exemption, it would still not be bound to register unless it 
had assets in excess of $1,000,000 and 500 or more shareholders,41 
 
 36. § 7201(7). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2000).  In this 
section, the term “person” means “a natural person, company, government, or 
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.”  § 78c(a)(9). 
 39. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2000). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2000). 
 41. § 78l(g)(1)(A). 
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or if it wanted to trade its stock on a national stock exchange.42  
However, if an ANC were to either voluntarily register its 
securities or be forced to register in order to have its stock traded 
on a national exchange, it would be an issuer for the purposes of 
SOX. 
The second way by which an ANC may be classified as an 
issuer is if it is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.43  That section requires that: 
Each issuer which has filed a registration statement containing 
an undertaking which is or becomes operative under this 
subsection as in effect prior to Aug. 20, 1964, [the date of 
enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,] and 
each issuer which shall after such date file a registration 
statement which has become effective pursuant to the Securities 
Act of 1933, as amended, shall file with the Commission, in 
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors, such supplementary and 
periodic information, documents, and reports as may be required 
pursuant to section 78m of this title in respect of a security 
registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.44 
In sum, an issuer who has registered with the SEC must file 
periodic reports containing certain financial information.45  As 
discussed previously, ANCs are, at the outset, exempted from SEC 
filings and registrations.46  However, there is nothing preventing an 
ANC from registering with the SEC.  In fact, this contingency is 
specifically provided for in the securities law exemption.47  If an 
ANC wishes to issue securities other than Settlement Common 
Stock, however, that ANC would lose its SEC exemption and then 
would have to register like any other publicly traded company.48  
Again, unless an ANC loses its SEC exemption, it is exempt 
because it is not an issuer. 
The third way by which an ANC would qualify as an issuer 
under SOX would be to file a registration statement with the SEC, 
even if that registration has not become effective, as long as the 
company has not withdrawn the registration.49  The analysis here 
 
 42. § 78l(a). 
 43. § 7201(7). 
 44. § 78o(d). 
 45. See id. 
 46. 43 U.S.C. § 1625(a). 
 47. See § 1625(a)(3) (permitting ANCs to file a registration statement with the 
SEC). 
 48. § 1625(a)(1). 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7). 
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mirrors that of the second test.  An ANC does not have to register 
unless it wants to broaden the types of securities it can issue, but it 
may choose to register for any reason at all.50  Under this third 
approach, any ANC that has registered, for any reason, would be 
an issuer for purposes of SOX.51  While an ANC may choose to 
pursue strategies that make it an issuer, no ANC has yet issued 
securities other than Settlement Common Stock, or voluntarily 
registered with the SEC.  While this does not mean that no ANC 
will become an issuer in the future, it does mean that currently no 
ANC is subject to those sections of SOX that apply only to issuers. 
IV.  APPLICABILITY OF SOX TO ANCS 
A. Jurisdiction of SOX 
The first task necessary to establish whether and to what 
degree ANCs must comply with SOX is to determine which 
sections of SOX are applicable to corporations and corporate 
officers, as opposed to accountants, accounting firms, investment 
brokers, and investment rating agencies. 
SOX is divided into eleven titles, each of which is applicable to 
specific parties.  This section of the Note will give an overview of 
each of the titles, and the following section will provide a closer 
analysis to sections that are of particular concern to ANCs.  Most 
titles do not directly affect ANCs, and those readers who are 
already familiar with the general structure and content of SOX 
may find the following analysis unnecessary for understanding the 
conclusions and recommendations of this Note. 
Title I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.52  This section outlines the organization of the Board,53 
requires that public accounting firms register with the Board,54 and 
grants the Board authority to establish rules regarding 
accountants.55  It further describes the duties of the Board56 and 
establishes how the Board will be funded.57  Title I also establishes 
 
 50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1625(a). 
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7). 
 52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. I (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7211–7219). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 2003). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (Supp. III 2003). 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 7231 (Supp. III 2003) (“The Board may. . .exempt 
any. . .accounting firm. . . .”). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214–15 (Supp. III 2003). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (Supp. III 2003). 
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the application of SOX to foreign accounting firms58 and how the 
Board is to recognize generally accepted accounting standards.59 
Thus, Title I deals with the establishment of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board and regulation and 
registration of accounting firms.60  To the extent that ANCs may 
use public accounting firms, this title may be relevant.  However, 
Title I will not directly impact the internal business of ANCs, 
though certain standards may apply to its outside accountants. 
Title II regulates auditor independence.61  It governs the 
relationship between auditors and public companies.62  Specifically, 
it establishes that the non-auditing services an accounting firm can 
provide to its auditing clients are very limited.63  Title II also limits 
the amount of time that a lead accounting partner can provide 
continuous service to the same public company, and provides 
various other regulations directed toward limiting the relationship 
between corporations and auditing accountants.64  Like Title I, this 
title may affect ANCs dealings with accounting firms, but Title II is 
primarily directed at accounting firm relationships with entities 
that are categorized as reporting companies. Accordingly, Title II 
will not have a major direct impact on ANCs since they are not 
reporting companies. 
Title III, in contrast, deals directly with “corporate 
responsibility.”65  It details the role of corporations in congressional 
efforts to regulate public disclosures of financial information.66  
This theme is continued in Title IV, which requires enhanced 
financial disclosures from corporations.67  Titles III and IV apply 
directly to the internal functions and public disclosures of 
 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (Supp. III 2003). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (Supp. III 2003). 
 60. §§ 7211–19. 
 61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. II (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 62. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. III 2003) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for a 
registered public accounting firm . . . to provide to that issuer” certain enumerated 
services.). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. III (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 66. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 78m(2) (“The audit committee of each issuer . . . shall be 
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work 
of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer . . . .”). 
 67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. ). 
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corporations.  Their effect on ANCs will be closely examined later 
in this Note. 
Title V is concerned with the regulation of securities analysts.68  
It addresses the problems that can stem from securities analysts’ 
power to manipulate securities prices through their 
recommendations.69  It includes a series of rules aimed at reducing 
the likelihood that analysts’ recommendations will be designed to 
affect the market instead of providing objective information.70  
Title V, therefore, will not directly affect the internal operations of 
ANCs. 
Title VI defines changes to the SEC’s authority under SOX 
provisions.71  It gives the SEC authority to deny any person the 
ability to practice before the SEC if that person has acted 
unprofessionally.72  It empowers federal courts and the SEC to 
prevent a person from offering penny stocks73 and to prevent 
people from being “associated” with a security dealer or broker.74  
It also amends the Securities Exchange Act in several ways to give 
the SEC more power to regulate people who work in the securities 
industry.75  Because this title is primarily directed at those people 
who professionally trade securities, it is unlikely to substantially 
affect ANCs. 
Title VII calls for studies and reports to be conducted dealing 
with various aspects of accounting firms, credit rating agencies, 
investment banks, and the enforcement actions that currently affect 
those entities.76  Because ANCs are not classified as any of these 
types of organizations, this section of SOX is unlikely to have any 
effect on ANCs. 
In contrast, Title VIII is applicable to corporate officers and 
stiffens penalties for those who commit corporate criminal fraud.77  
This section is directed toward those people who take actions to 
mislead the public about a company’s financial condition.78  It is not 
 
 68. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. V, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-6, u-2 (Supp. III 2003). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. §78o-6. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VI (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a). 
 73. §§ 77t(g), 78u(a)(6). 
 74. § 78o. 
 75. § 78o-6. 
 76. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VII. 
 77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VIII (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519–20. 
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limited to executives of issuers or those within reporting 
companies. It affects all people, but especially corporate officers, 
including executives of ANCs. 
Title IX is similar to Title VIII, except that it is broader and 
deals with white-collar crime.79  Specifically, it includes provisions 
regarding attempt and conspiracy to commit securities fraud80 and 
mail and wire fraud,81 establishes criminal penalties for failing to 
fully report corporate financial information,82 and includes general 
sentencing guidelines on white-collar crimes.83  This title is not 
limited to issuers or reporting companies and is applicable to 
anyone in a position to commit white-collar crimes, including 
directors and employees of ANCs. 
Title X is a very short section simply stating that the United 
States Senate believes that a federal tax return from a corporation 
should be signed by the chief executive officer of the corporation.84  
While this provision may seem trivial, it nonetheless concerns 
businesses and, accordingly, is a provision that may be applicable 
to ANCs. 
Title XI is another provision that deals with accountability for 
corporate fraud.85  It defines penalties for tampering with records,86 
confers upon the SEC authority to temporarily freeze a company’s 
activities while an investigation is pending,87 and prevents people 
who have violated securities laws from serving as officers or 
directors of companies.88  It also requests that the federal criminal 
sentencing guidelines be amended89 and adds a section to the 
criminal section of the U.S. Code that punishes retaliation against 
corporate informants.90  The effects of these provisions are not 
limited to officers of issuers or reporting companies, so they have 
the potential to affect ANCs and their officers. 
 
 79. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IX (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. ). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. III 2003). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 2003). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. III 2003). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. III 2003). 
 84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. X. 
 85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. XI (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.).. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3) (Supp. III 2003). 
 88. § 78u-3(f). 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 994. 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 1513. 
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In sum, six of the eleven titles that comprise SOX encompass 
areas that may affect ANCs and their directors.  These are (i) Title 
III, Corporate Responsibility; (ii) Title IV, Enhanced Financial 
Disclosures; (iii) Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability; (iv) Title IX, White-Collar Crime Penalty 
Enhancements; (v) Title X, Corporate Tax Returns; and  (vi) Title 
XI, Corporate Fraud Accountability.  Each of these titles has 
unique jurisdictional properties which will be examined separately. 
B. Specific SOX Titles and Their Applicability to ANCs 
1. Title III: Corporate Responsibility.  Title III creates several 
reporting responsibilities for companies.  Whether or not ANCs 
are affected depends on the threshold determination of whether an 
ANC is an issuer.  Those ANCs that are—or that wish to become—
issuers would have several duties under Title III. 
First, any ANC which is an issuer must establish an audit 
committee to oversee the work of any public accounting firm that is 
employed by the ANC.91  This committee is made of members of 
the board of directors of the company but must “otherwise be 
independent” of the corporation.92  The standard for 
“independent” focuses primarily on economic and personal 
relationships between the audit committee member and the 
issuer.93 
Second, ANCs that file SEC reports must have those reports 
certified as accurate by the “principal executive officer or officers, 
and the principal financial officer and officers.”94  This provision 
will, of course, not apply to ANCs that do not have to file SEC 
reports.  Any ANCs that do file SEC reports, whether voluntarily 
or because they have lost their SEC immunity, will have to comply 
with this section. 
Third, the section of the corporate responsibility obligations 
under SOX prohibits an issuer from exerting undue influence on 
auditors.95  Again, this will only affect ANCs who have become 
issuers.  Fourth, issuers must refrain from acting to coerce, mislead, 
or otherwise manipulate auditors.96  Fifth, CEOs and CFOs must 
use their bonuses to reimburse an issuer in the event that 
 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1. 
 92. § 78j-1(m)(3). 
 93. See § 78j-1(m)(3)(B). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. III 2003). 
 95. § 7242. 
 96. § 7242(a). 
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misconduct by a CEO or CFO requires that issuer to prepare an 
accounting restatement.97 
Sixth, a major section of Title III is devoted to requiring that 
directors and executive officers cease all personal trading in 
securities of the issuer that employs them, if that issuer is 
experiencing a “blackout period.”98  A blackout period is a time of 
at least three consecutive days when employees are prevented from 
trading the issuer’s securities within their individual portfolio 
accounts.99  The final provision, which requires attorneys who are 
working for an issuer to report evidence of material violations of 
securities laws, also only applies to issuers.100  Title III provides 
many examples of responsibilities under SOX that an ANC may 
avoid by not taking actions to become an issuer. 
2. Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures.  SOX devotes an 
entire title to clarifying and intensifying financial disclosure 
requirements.101  The most critical thing to note about this title is 
that it is an amendment to Section 13 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.102  ANCs that have kept their exemption from the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not affected by Title IV of 
SOX. 
A complete and exhaustive account of what is required of 
issuers under Title IV would not be practical to pursue in this 
analysis.  Generally speaking, ANCs that are issuers must: disclose 
off-balance sheet transactions;103 decline to give personal loans to 
executives, unless those loans fall into a series of narrow 
exceptions, as defined in SOX;104 disclose transactions which 
involved either a holder of more than ten percent of any class of 
the issuer’s securities, or a member of the management of the 
issuer;105 abide by a code of ethics, as set by the SEC, for financial 
officers;106 disclose whether or not there is a financial expert on the 
audit committee, and if there is not, explain why there is not an 
 
 97. § 7243. 
 98. § 7244(a)(1). 
 99. § 7244(a)(4)(A). 
 100. § 7245(1). 
 101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j). 
 104. § 78m(k)(a). 
 105. § 78p(a)(1). 
 106. § 7264. 
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expert;107 and finally, submit to an enhanced review of their 
periodic financial disclosures108 and make immediate disclosures of 
new financial information concerning a material change in the 
financial condition of the company.109 
In sum, an ANC that becomes an issuer is exposed to a 
barrage of new regulations.  Those who are exempt under 43 
U.S.C. § 1625 completely escape these new regulations, and are 
free to continue operating as they have been in regard to financial 
disclosures. 
3. Title VIII: Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability.  
From its first provision, Title VIII is different and more potent 
than its counterparts.  For example, it is not limited to “issuers,” 
but rather “whoever” falls within its provisions.110  Its first provision 
is that anyone who knowingly alters information relating to any 
matter concerning a Title 11 bankruptcy may be fined or 
imprisoned up to twenty years.111  This certainly affects ANCs to 
the extent that it may encourage employees and officers to abide 
by bankruptcy laws, but it does not create any additional corporate 
laws.  Accordingly, it is unlikely to have any impact on the 
operations of an ANC.  Next, Title VIII provides sentencing 
guidelines for individuals who destroy corporate audit records of 
an issuer.112 
The second section is another that stands out as having a 
potential effect on ANCs. It modifies Title 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code by making debts non-dischargeable if they are 
incurred in violation of a securities law.113  What makes this 
important to all ANCs is that the violation that triggers this 
provision can be a violation of any securities law, state or federal.114  
This means that an ANC may lose the ability to discharge some of 
its debt if it violates statutes that affect all ANCs (for example, 
state statutes that require disclosure to ANC shareholders).115  Most 
importantly, this part of SOX applies whether or not the ANC is an 
issuer.116 
 
 107. § 7265. 
 108. § 7266. 
 109. § 78m(l). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
 111. Id. 
 112. §1520. 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003). 
 114. Id. 
 115. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.433 (2004). 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
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The somewhat subtle implications of this provision warrant 
special attention.  As will be shown later in this paper, 43 U.S.C. § 
1625 requires ANCs to comply with the SOX provision that 
obligates the principal executive officer to certify that the 
company’s annual report is accurate.117  Bearing that in mind, 
suppose that a bank makes a loan to an ANC and relies upon its 
annual report to determine that the company is creditworthy for 
this particular loan.  Suppose next that the company goes into 
bankruptcy, and wishes to discharge all or a portion of that loan.  
Suppose further that it is discovered that the annual report was 
inaccurate.  It certainly seems possible that the officer’s 
certification in this case was a violation of a securities law and that 
the bank’s reliance on the annual report will make the loan non-
dischargeable.  There may be room here for counter-arguments, 
including that the violation was not “for” the loan, but this is 
certainly a scenario of which ANCs should be aware and consider 
carefully when they incur debts.118 
Title VIII also extends the statute of limitations for civil claims 
involving corporate fraud.119  This is only a procedural change, 
however, and does not modify any substantive law.120  Another 
provision to protect whistleblowers similarly does not change 
substantive law.121  It prevents corporate actors from discriminating 
against employees who have disclosed evidence of fraud.122  This 
applies only to companies that have securities registered with the 
SEC (which would only include ANCs who have either registered 
securities other than Settlement Common Stock or those who have 
voluntarily registered). 
The last section of Title VIII creates criminal penalties for 
defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies.123  It also 
applies only to issuers and creates criminal penalties for anyone 
who fraudulently obtains money or other property in connection 
with the sale of securities.124 
Title VIII thus has significant impact on the management of 
ANCs that may become issuers in the future.  Executives of those 
companies will be subject to increased criminal liability and are 
 
 117. See infra Part V. 
 118. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i). 
 119. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. III 2003) (extending the statute of limitations to 
four years). 
 120. See id. 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. III 2003). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 1348. 
 124. Id. 
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liable in civil suits for a longer period of time.125  As to non-issuers, 
it creates criminal liability in the event of fraud126 and decreases 
bankruptcy protections in cases where an ANC has violated 
securities laws.127 
4. Title IX: White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements.  Title 
IX, a criminal provision, applies more universally than some other 
SOX titles.  In this regard, it is one of the stronger provisions.  At 
the same time, however, since it is a criminal code, it applies more 
strongly to directors, officers, and other employees than to ANCs 
themselves. Although business entities can be fined in a criminal 
action, only individuals can be placed in jail. 
Ideally, Title IX will not affect ANCs’ business at all (since all 
affiliated people should obey the law).  However, it may have a 
chilling effect on some activities, particularly those which are close 
to the line of being illegal, and in this way may affect ANCs’ 
business practices. 
The first provision of Title IX penalizes attempts and 
conspiracies to commit securities crimes just as much as if the 
person had committed the crime himself.128 This could have a 
significant impact on executives who previously may have been 
more willing to go along with potential illegal practices, when that 
individual was not at the heart of the illegal activity. 
Next, Title IX dramatically increases the penalties for criminal 
mail and wire fraud.129  The jail time for such violations is increased 
from five to twenty years.130  Similarly, the penalties for violating 
the Employee Benefits Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
are substantially stiffened.131 SOX Title IX also calls for the United 
States Sentencing Commission to make a large-scale review of 
white-collar crime sentences.132 
Finally, it creates criminal sanctions for knowingly failing to 
properly certify financial reports filed with the SEC.133  While this 
 
 125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Supp. III 2003). 
 129. § 1341. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. III 2003) (raising fines of individuals to $100,000 
maximum and fines of non-individuals to $500,000; raising jail penalties to ten 
years.). 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 994. 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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technically applies to “whoever,”134 the practical effect of having 
this penalty attached to SEC filings is that only executives at ANCs 
who are also issuers are affected by this provision. 
5. Title X: Corporate Tax Return.  Title X is a unique SOX 
provision because it does not provide for its own enforcement.135  It 
merely says that it is the opinion of the Senate that the CEO of a 
company should sign the federal income tax statement of that 
company.136  This provision was not incorporated into the U.S. 
Code, but exists only within SOX itself.  It does not appear that this 
will affect ANCs in any official way, but, in light of this provision, it 
would be a good idea for all ANCs to have their CEO sign any tax 
information that goes to the federal government. 
6. Title XI: Corporate Fraud Accountability.  Title XI is a mix 
of criminal penalties and enabling clauses designed to help curb 
corporate fraud.137  It first creates criminal liability for anyone who 
interferes with, or attempts to interfere with an “official 
proceeding.”138  It goes on to give the SEC power to temporarily 
freeze payments to people under investigation for securities 
violations.139  However, this power only exists when the 
investigation concerns an issuer.140 
Under SOX Title XI, the SEC has significant power to prevent 
any person who has committed a securities violation from 
becoming an officer or director of an issuer.141  The last provision is 
a modification of the criminal code, which affects issuers and non-
issuers alike.142  It is essentially a whistleblower clause that punishes 
employers for retaliation, “including interference with the lawful 
employment or livelihood of any person” who has provided 
truthful information to the SEC.143 
These provisions create some criminal liabilities for officers of 
ANCs, but unless that ANC is an issuer, the corporations 
themselves largely avoid the effects of Title XI.  However, 
 
 134. § 1519. 
 135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. X. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. XI (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (permitting the issuance of a temporary order). 
 142. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). 
 143. Id. 
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directors of ANCs who might otherwise be tempted to commit 
securities fraud, and then try to cover their tracks, may think again 
in light of the provision regarding interference with official 
proceedings. 
C. The Collective Implications for ANCs 
The preceding analysis shows that there are only eight 
provisions of SOX that apply to ANCs that are not issuers: (i) Title 
VIII criminal liability for anyone who knowingly alters information 
relating to a bankruptcy;144  (ii) Title VIII’s provision which makes 
certain debts non-dischargeable if they are incurred in violation of 
securities laws;145  (iii) Title VIII extension of the statute of 
limitations for civil claims involving securities fraud;146  (iv) Title IX 
provision making attempt and conspiracy to commit securities 
crimes penalized the same as the underlying crime;147  (v) Title IX 
increased penalties for mail and wire fraud;148  (vi) Title X 
declaration of Congress’s opinion that the CEO of a company 
should sign all federal tax returns coming from the company;149  
(vii) Title XI criminal penalties for anyone who interferes with 
official proceedings;150 and (viii) Title XI criminal sanctions that 
protect corporate whistleblowers from being deprived of their 
livelihood.151 
Six of these are criminal provisions that are primarily directed 
at individual executives, and one of the remaining statutes is 
merely an alteration to civil procedure and does not affect any 
substantive law.  That leaves only items number two and number 
six from the list above.  Furthermore, number six is a mere opinion 
of Congress that does not come with any enforceability clause.  
Therefore, it is only number two above—the SOX section that 
makes debts non-dischargeable in bankruptcy if those debts were 
incurred in violation of securities laws152—that directly affects the 
business of non-issuer ANCs.  This provision only applies in 
bankruptcy, and then only if debts were incurred illegally.  
Consequently, ANCs which are not issuers avoid nearly all of the 
force of SOX.  There are no structural changes, disclosure changes, 
 
 144. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
 145. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 1349. 
 148. §§ 1341, 1343. 
 149. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit X. 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). 
 151. § 1513(e). 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003). 
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or securities practice changes that will affect non-issuer ANCs as a 
direct result of SOX. 
V.  A LEGAL HOOK UNDER 43 U.S.C. § 1625 
There is one more possibility for bringing ANCs under the 
regulatory requirements of SOX.  The same federal law that 
exempts ANCs from the Securities Exchange Act also addresses 
disclosure obligations.153  Specifically, it provides that 
[a] Native Corporation that, but for this section, would be 
subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
[15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.] shall annually prepare and transmit to 
its shareholders a report that contains substantially all the 
information required to be included in an annual report to 
shareholders by a corporation subject to that Act.154 
There are two ways in which an ANC could become otherwise 
subject to the Securities Exchange Act.  First, if it has securities 
listed on a national exchange155 and, second, if it has assets in excess 
of $1,000,000 and also has equity securities held by 500 or more 
people.156 
At present, no ANC has any securities listed on a national 
exchange.  However, many, if not all, ANCs have assets in excess of 
$1,000,000157  and more than 500 shareholders.158  Therefore, ANCs 
are currently required to “prepare and transmit to its shareholders 
a report that contains substantially all the information required to 
be included in an annual report to shareholders by a corporation 
subject to that Act.”159  Since SOX made amendments to the 
 
 153. 43 U.S.C. § 1625. 
 154. § 1625(c)(1). 
 155. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a). 
 156. See § 78l(g)(1)(B). 
 157. For example, Sealaska Native Corporation has over $276 million in assets. 
Sealaska 2004 Annual Report, http://www.sealaska.com/2004AR/pdfs/2004-
03_cbs.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).  This raises a difficult valuation issue which 
will not be analyzed here.  Many ANCs own vast amounts of land, much of which 
is very remote.  The remoteness and relative seclusion of the land makes valuing it 
very difficult.  This could be the subject of a difficult dispute if the $1,000,000 
threshold was ever a point of contention between an ANC and the SEC or a 
shareholder. 
 158. For example, Calista Native Corporation originally had 13,303 
shareholders.  Calista Corporation Business Enterprises, http://www.calista 
corp.com/share1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).  While the number of 
shareholders will fluctuate somewhat due to inheritances or gifting, the total 
number of Calista, or any ANC shareholders, is very unlikely to ever drop below 
500.  Id. 
 159. 43 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(1) (2000). 
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Securities Exchange Act, it thereby brings ANCs under some of its 
requirements—or, at least “substantially” under those 
requirements, but only insofar as SOX modified the annual report 
requirement.160 
SOX makes changes to several annual reporting requirements.  
It demands that the principal executive officer certify that the 
annual report is accurate.161  It also requires the disclosure of off-
balance sheet transactions162 and that each annual report state the 
company’s structure of internal reporting.163  One problematic 
requirement is for the disclosure of whether or not the audit 
committee contains at least one financial expert.164  It is unclear 
how this rule could apply to ANCs, which are not required to have 
an audit committee.165 
Though these changes will affect the annual reporting 
requirements of ANCs, they escape SOX’s enhanced review of 
those annual reports.166  Recall that though some provisions of SOX 
are applied to ANCs via section 1625, ANCs are still outside the 
jurisdiction of the SEC. 
Section 1625, combined with SOX’s changes to existing 
regulations, will affect some of the reporting requirements of 
ANCs.  However, it is only a sliver of SOX that makes its way 
through.  Furthermore, enforcement of those provisions is not 
under the jurisdiction of the SEC, which is the body charged with 
enforcing SOX.  While these new requirements doubtlessly push 
ANCs in the direction of more full disclosures to shareholders, they 
represent only a fraction of the protections and regulations brought 
upon ordinary corporations by SOX. 
VI.  CONSIDERATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT—ARE THESE 
RESULTS ACCEPTABLE?  
SOX was enacted in response to “those who have shaken 
confidence in our markets.”167  Its purpose was “to address the 
systematic and structural weakness affecting our capital markets 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j). 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
 164. § 7265. 
 165. § 78j-1; see supra Part IV.B.1. 
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 7266. 
 167. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by President George W. Bush 
at Signing of Corporate Accountability Bill (July 30, 2002), in FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, INC., 2002. 
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which were revealed . . . in recent months and years.”168  The 
paradigmatic example of these revelations were the financially 
catastrophic events related to the fall of Enron and WorldCom, 
both specifically mentioned by Congress in SOX’s legislative 
history.169  The question, then, is whether ANCs have a significant 
potential to cause the sort of damage that was caused by the 
misdeeds of Enron and WorldCom. 
The Senate report on the collapse of Enron first focuses on the 
“shock waves” that Enron’s bankruptcy sent through the American 
economy.170  Enron was the seventh largest company in the U.S. at 
the time of its collapse, and its bankruptcy had broad effects on the 
market.171  Of particular concern to the Senate was the fact that the 
collapse affected, either directly or indirectly, the investments of 
“over half” of American families.172  Furthermore, Enron 
shareholders realized huge losses on their investments, and those 
Enron employees who had their retirement funds invested in 
company stock saw devastating and life-changing losses with the 
collapse of Enron’s stock.173  These were the core harms that 
Congress responded to when they enacted SOX. 
The collapse of an ANC would not likely have a massive effect 
on the national economy.  While some ANCs are quite large,174 
they do not compare to the size and economic power of Enron.  
Furthermore, an ANC collapse would have virtually no effect on 
the stock market, because their securities are not traded on stock 
markets.175  It appears that this first concern of Congress is not 
relevant in the case of ANCs. 
Congress’s second core concern was for owners of Enron’s 
stock, either through market investment or through retirement 
accounts.  An analysis of this factor in regard to ANCs shows some 
clear distinctions.  First, ANC shareholders do not, in the 
traditional sense, “invest” in the corporation.  Instead, stock was 
 
 168. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002). 
 169. Id. at 2, 29 n.59. 
 170. Id. at 1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Afognak Native Corporation and its subsidiaries, for example, have offices 
from Alaska to Hawaii to Florida.  Alutiiq LLC, http://www.alutiiq.com/map.php 
(last visited Sep. 10, 2006). 
 175. The Senate investigation did also recognize the cumulative effect on the 
national economy of nonpayment of contracts associated with bankruptcies. S. 
REP. NO. 107-70, at 1 (2001).  However, this effect from an ANC bankruptcy is 
likely to be relatively small, and not a threat to the national economy. 
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distributed to them as part of a large-scale settlement with the U.S. 
government.176  Second, since all current ANC stock is not 
transferable, stockholders do not have an economic interest in the 
market value of the share. 
A collapse of an ANC would still be very harmful because it 
would deprive shareholders of dividends on their settlement 
common stock.  Recall that the primary purpose of ANCs is to 
distribute the benefits of the ANCSA to Alaska Natives.177  A 
collapse of an ANC due to poor accounting practices or financial 
mismanagement would be a shameful failure of an ANC to reach 
its goal.  While Congress did not consider exactly this issue, it is 
well within its goals and general intent to protect ANC 
shareholders from losing the benefits of owning Settlement 
Common Stock. 
An argument may be raised that SOX-type protections are not 
necessary for ANCs, because they have a deeper commitment to 
their shareholders than a traditional corporation.  Their history and 
purpose is different than those of a traditional for-profit company.  
Indeed, this is reflected in the missions of ANCs.  For example, the 
mission statement of Afognak Native Corporation provides that 
the company’s governing body exists “to manage and protect 
cultural resources, to manage and protect our land resources, to 
reinvigorate Alutiiq identity and social structure, and to heal 
divisions among the Alutiiq people.”178  The mission statements of 
most, if not all, ANCs mirror these general goals.  They all seek to 
provide for Alaska Natives and take a holistic approach toward 
achieving this goal.  One may think that it is unlikely that an 
organization which operates by those goals would ever engage in 
the type of harmful activities addressed by SOX.  Unfortunately, 
history has shown otherwise. 
The Cape Fox Corporation experienced financial 
mismanagement in 1996 and 1997 when its Chairman of the Board 
of Directors stole from the corporation, and managers took money 
from the corporation in the form of personal loans.179  Personal 
loans to executives are exactly one of the findings from Enron180 
that Congress sought to address with SOX.181 
 
 176. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2000). 
 177. See § 1606(j). 
 178. Native Village of Afognak, http://www.afognak.org/governance.php (last 
visited Sep. 10, 2006). 
 179. Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp., 113 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Alaska 2005). 
 180. S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 26 (2001). 
 181. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
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In 1990, the Kake Corporation made illegal and unauthorized 
dividend payments to a select group of shareholders.182  The injured 
shareholders in that case were eventually awarded damages, but 
the misappropriation of dividends and the expense of the lawsuit 
might have been avoided if there had been greater scrutiny and 
transparency on the process by which Kake made financial 
decisions. 
Admittedly, these scandals were minor in comparison to the 
massive downfalls of Enron and WorldCom.  However, they are 
just as important for the individual stockholders who were harmed, 
and they show that ANCs have the potential to cause damages 
similar to those that SOX sought to prevent.  It would seem that 
Congress made a mistake in allowing ANCs to slip through the nets 
of SOX. 
VII.  LOOKING FORWARD: HOW ANCS SHOULD ADAPT 
INTERNAL BEST PRACTICES TO SOX 
By and large, ANCs avoid the requirements of SOX.  This 
means that shareholders of ANCs are not granted the protections 
of that act.  This is unfortunate because the type of protection that 
SOX grants may be even more important to ANC shareholders 
than to equity holders in ordinary companies. 
It must be remembered that the primary purpose of ANCs is 
to distribute benefits of the ANCSA to Alaska Natives.183  Because 
of this, ANCs should take upon themselves a greater fiduciary 
responsibility to their shareholders than an ordinary corporation.  
The directors and management of ANCs should take steps above 
and beyond what is required by the law to make sure that the 
purpose of their corporations, to protect and expand the interests 
of every holder of Settlement Common Stock, is fulfilled. 
SOX, though not legally binding, should be used as a guideline 
to protect the interests of ANC stockholders.  Congress has taken 
extensive time and energy to develop a system of protecting 
shareholders from known dangers to their interests, dangers from 
which ANCs are not immune.  Managers and board members of 
ANCs should take advantage of Congress’s work and implement 
corporate guidelines, or “best practices,” which are identical to 
SOX in every way that is relevant to the corporations they control. 
For example, ANCs should have to create an audit committee 
to oversee the auditing and accounting practices within their 
companies.  The cost of implementing these guidelines would not 
 
 182. Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997). 
 183. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (2000). 
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be insignificant, but would be cheap in comparison to the costs 
associated with a corporate meltdown like Enron and WorldCom 
experienced.  Above all, the costs would be an investment in 
protecting the interests of shareholders. 
A final and substantial problem that ANCs may have in 
implementing SOX-like guidelines is enforcement.  Without a body 
like the SEC overseeing and enforcing the best practices, the 
guidelines would be enforced by the same people they are meant to 
regulate.  A prudent way of dealing with this problem would be to 
have a stockholder-selected and fully independent compliance 
committee.  This committee would take exactly the same role as 
the SEC has in SOX and would be vested with all the same powers 
that are afforded the SEC under SOX.  This group could even be 
integrated with the audit committee mentioned previously.  They 
would be the watchdog for shareholders who would ensure that the 
types of harms that were the catalyst for SOX litigation do not 
befall ANCs and their shareholders. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
An examination of SOX reveals that it will have a minimal 
effect on ANCs which are not issuers.  Currently, that means that 
ANCs largely escape SOX.  However, the fact that SOX does not 
apply to ANCs does not mean that they are not capable of causing 
the harms that SOX was meant to protect against.  ANCs should 
protect their stockholders by instituting internal best practices that 
mirror SOX requirements.  This would be a meaningful step 
toward living up to the ANCs’ purpose.  Internal governance 
similar to SOX would help ensure that the benefits of ANCSA are 
distributed to owners of Settlement Common Stock for years and 
generations to come. 
